This article examines the impact of direct presidential elections on legislative party systems. We argue that presidential power shapes the effective number of presidential candidates in a way that will have a reductive effect on the legislative party system, but this reduction will be observed only within an intermediary range of presidential power. We also argue that this proposition should be tested solely on the population of countries with direct presidential elections. We find that the effect of presidential coattails is less important than has typically been suggested, that by contrast presidential power has an influence on the legislative party system, but also that we need to think carefully about how to capture variation in presidential power when trying to estimate its effect. This latter point applies to the debate about the determinants of the legislative party system but also to debates about the effect of presidential power more generally.
Introduction
There is a vast literature on the determinants of legislative party systems. At the most general level, there is basic agreement that institutional and social factors interact to generate party system structures. To this end, scholars typically focus on the effects of specific electoral systems and the impact of social heterogeneity (Cox 1997; Lijphart 1994; Mozaffar et al 2003) . However, scholars have increasingly integrated other factors into the study of legislative party systems. Specifically, there is an ongoing debate about the effect of direct presidential elections. Here, there is support for the proposition that presidential coattails help to shape the legislative party system (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Mozaffar et al 2003; Golder 2006; Samuels and Shugart 2010; Shugart 1995; Hicken and Stoll 2013; Stoll 2013) . The idea that the relative proximity of presidential and legislative elections is a determinant of the electoral competition is highly intuitive. However, recent work has stressed how the effect of presidential coattails is contingent upon other factors.
Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and Golder (2006) have emphasized the interaction between the proximity of elections and the effective number of presidential candidates at the previous presidential election. In turn, Hicken and Stoll (2013) have stressed the importance of presidential power as a further interaction term.
In this article, we build on existing work. First, we argue that propositions about presidential coattails should be tested solely on the population of countries with direct presidential elections, whereas to date such propositions have included parliamentary republics and monarchies in the sample. Second, we follow Hicken and Stoll in hypothesizing that presidential power is likely to shape the effective number of presidential candidates in a way that will have a reductive effect on the legislative party system, but we argue that this reduction will be clearly observed only within an intermediary range of presidential power. This is because political parties have a distinct incentive to coordinate their electoral behavior at presidential elections only within such a range. By contrast, with both weak and strong presidents there are conflicting coordination incentives. When we test our proposition on a selection of democracies with direct presidential elections in the period 1945-2011 inclusive we find good support for it. However, we also show that with different measures of presidential power the reductive effect of presidential power can be seen when there are weak presidencies too.
Overall, our findings suggest that the effect of presidential coattails is less important than has typically been suggested, that by contrast presidential power has an influence on the legislative party system, but also that we need to think carefully about how to capture variation in presidential power when trying to estimate its effect. This latter point applies to the debate about the determinants of the legislative party system but also to debates about the effect of presidential power more generally.
Theory
There is now a considerable body of work on the determinants of party systems. The effects of electoral systems are well known (Shugart 2005) .
However, the institutional determinants of party systems are not confined to electoral systems. Increasingly, there is an interest in the impact of direct presidential elections on the number of competitive political parties at legislative elections. When the president is elected on a separate ballot from members of the legislature, parties have to compete at two separate contests.
This generates the potential for what Samuels and Shugart (2010: ch. 5 ) call "an electoral separation of purpose". The electoral separation of purpose can vary. A low separation of purpose occurs when the presidential and legislative electorates of parties overlap. When this happens, similar to parliamentary systems presidents neither hurt nor improve their parties' fortunes in legislative elections. A high separation of purpose occurs when the electorate for the presidential candidate is substantially different from that of candidates in the legislative race. What factors influence the variation in the electoral separation of purpose?
One highly intuitive factor is the proximity of the presidential election to the legislative election (Shugart 1995) . There is now considerable evidence that if the presidential election is held proximately to the legislative election, then there will be a reductive effect on legislative party system (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Mozaffar et al 2003; Golder 2006) . Working on the assumption that the presidency is the most important institution in the system, the presidential election becomes the focus of electoral competition. In this context, legislative elections approach second-order elections, especially when they are held immediately after the system-defining presidential election. The primacy of presidential over legislative elections ensures that presidential elections can have substantial coattails effects, shaping the legislative party system in its image. We see an example of this effect at work in France. In 2000 a constitutional amendment reduced the length of the president's term to five years, the same as for the legislature. At the same time, legislative elections were scheduled a few weeks after the presidential election. The result is that however close the result, there is a strong incentive for voters at the honeymoon legislative election to confirm the outcome of the presidential election, returning a majority for the newly elected president. We can clearly observe this effect following both the 2002, 2007, and 2012 presidential elections. Extrapolating on the basis of this logic, when the temporal gap between presidential and legislative elections grows, the shadow of the presidential election weakens. Thus, the coattails effect declines as the gap between the two elections increases.
Another factor is the presidential party system. There are good grounds to believe that the effective number of candidates at the presidential election shapes the effect of the proximity of presidential and legislative elections on the legislative party system. Cox (1997: 212) argues: "[t]he nature of the coattail opportunities that face legislative candidates should be similar, the nature of the advertising economies of scale that might be exploited should be similar, and so forth". Thus, if there is a small number of candidates at the presidential election, this can reinforce the reductive effects of proximity on the legislative party system. By contrast, if the number of presidential candidates is high, then the reductive effects of proximity may be counteracted. Indeed, a high number of presidential candidates may have an inflationary effect on the legislative party system. Golder (2006) has tested and found support for this hypothesis. Specifically, he finds that presidential elections "stop having a statistically significant reductive effect on the number of electoral parties once there are more than about 2.8 effective presidential candidates" (ibid.: 40). Thus, Golder (ibid.) prioritizes the interaction between the proximity of presidential and legislative elections and the effective number of candidates at the presidential election.
Recently, Hicken and Stoll (2013) have added a further factor to this debate. They emphasize the importance of presidential power. The direct election of the president does not imply that the president is the central political actor in the system. There are countries with directly elected but very weak presidents. Ireland is a case in point. There are others with relatively strong presidents, such as France, and yet others with very powerful presidents indeed, for example Chile. Thus, the size of the presidential prize varies from one country to another. As a result, there is no necessary reason to believe that presidential elections will always have the same impact on legislative elections. Instead, the effect of proximity and the number of candidates at the presidential election will depend on what Hicken and Stoll (ibid.: 295) call the "horizontal centralization" of policy-making authority.
This means that a weak presidency may counteract the reductive effect of very proximate presidential and legislative elections on the legislative party system even when there are few candidates at the presidential election. In sum, Hicken and Stoll (2013) prioritize the interaction between the proximity of presidential and legislative elections, the effective number of candidates at the presidential election, and the power of the presidency.
We aim to make two contributions to this debate. The first concerns the context to which it should be applied. To date, the theoretical insights of this literature have all been tested on data sets that pool countries with directly However, the inclusion of parliamentary systems is somewhat puzzling, because the theory relates solely to the effects of direct presidential elections on legislative elections. What is the theoretical justification for including parliamentary systems in the study? Surprisingly, only Hicken and Stoll (2013) provide such a justification. They state: "the ultimate counterfactual to a presidential election being held concurrently with a legislative election is no presidential election at all. In other words, at the most basic level, the experimental "treatment" is the existence of a presidential election" (ibid: 300).
They go on to say: "we compare the legislative party systems of the treatment group (legislative elections in regimes with a popularly elected president) to the legislative party systems of the control group (legislative elections in regimes without a popularly elected president)" (ibid.). Stoll (2013) reiterates this logic.
The language of natural experimentation is alluring. Even so, we can question whether these studies meet basic experimental conditions. In particular, we can question whether the assignment of the treatment is 'as if' random (Dunning 2008) . For example, there may be 'demonstration effects' such that countries choose systems that are close to their neighbors. The adoption of presidentialism across Latin America is a case in point. In addition, even if the treatment was assigned 'as if' randomly, are the treatment and control groups comparable (Sekhon and Titiunik 2012) ? The same subjects are not observed before and after the application of a particular treatment or placebo. Instead, the differences within and between the subjects in the two groups are merely controlled for in the multivariate regression. This is an entirely appropriate way to test the theory, but it is not a natural experiment. Finally, when we conduct a natural experiment, we include a control group to provide us with variation in the explanatory variable.
However, when we examine the effects of proximity, the effective number of presidential candidates, and presidential power on legislative party systems, we do not need the variation that comes with a control group. There is already variation within the set of countries with directly elected presidents.
To put it another way, the experimental "treatment" is not the existence of a presidential election, it is the presence or absence of proximate presidential and legislative elections, a higher or lower number of effective presidential candidates, and stronger or weaker presidents. We should still be able to observe the effects of these variables solely within the population under consideration without the need for a parliamentary "control group".
In sum, we question whether parliamentary systems should be included in a test of a theory about the effects of direct presidential elections.
We are skeptical as to whether their inclusion can be justified as an example of a natural experiment. Moreover, even if they are included, we would still expect the results to be robust to their exclusion. If they are not, then this would suggest that any positive findings are being driven by their inclusion in the dataset, rather than by the substantive effect on the population to which the hypothesized effect applies.
Secondly, we think differently about the nature of the interaction between presidential power and the effective number of presidential candidates. We follow Cox (1997) above in thinking that there is a positive relationship between the effective number of presidential candidates and the legislative party system. We also have good theoretical reasons to expect that presidential power will affect the number of candidates at the presidential election. Hicken and Stoll (2008) have already proposed such a relationship.
They hypothesize that when the presidency is very weak, parties have little incentive to stand candidates. So, the number of candidates should be small. However, when presidential power increases somewhat, then parties have more of an incentive to stand, but they have little incentive to coordinate their presidential candidates, meaning that number of candidates contesting the presidential election should be relatively high. When presidential power increases further still, the incentive for strategic coordination is present, meaning that the number of candidates should decline. Thus, they expect a bell-shaped curve. They find some evidence to support this theory, though as presidential power increases they find that the reductive effect disappears. In fact, they find that when presidents are very powerful, there is a puzzling increase in the number of candidates once again. So, rather than a bell-shaped curve, they find a sideways, elongated S shape (ibid.: 1120). At this high level of presidential power, though, the relationship with the number of presidential candidates is not statistically significant.
We agree with Hicken and Stoll that there is likely to be a relationship between presidential power and the number of presidential candidates that will shape the legislative party system, but we think differently about the logic. We agree that when there is a very weak presidency, there may be little incentive for parties to stand a candidate at the presidential election. It may be more efficient to save the costs of campaigning for the legislative election. At the same time, though, when there is a very weak presidency the political costs of losing the presidential election are also very small. Moreover, nonpartisan candidates may have a greater incentive to stand. If the presidential election is seen as a second-order election, then partisan voting may be weak and non-partisan candidates may stand a greater chance of winning votes. Therefore, even when there is a very weak presidency, we may observe a large number of presidential candidates. Thus, a very weak presidency can be associated both with a small number of presidential candidates and a large number. Ireland is a case in point. Here, the president is very weak and since 1937 six presidential elections have been uncontested. This suggests that the presidency is a prize that is scarcely worth winning and parties do not always see an incentive to contest it. Even so, in 2011 there were seven candidates with an effective number of 3.75. In addition to party nominees, there were also non-partisan candidates, one of whom came second at the election. So, the same country has experienced both very low and relatively high numbers of presidential candidates as a function of the calculations made by partisan and non-partisan actors.
We expect an equivalent dual logic when the presidency is very powerful. In this case, the prize may be so big that parties have little incentive to engage in strategic coordination. The costs of not standing and, therefore, not winning the presidency may be so great that there is an incentive for parties to stand. So, Shugart and Carey (1992: 201) point out that if the stakes are sufficiently high, then the certainty of losing the presidency by not contesting it may be much worse than the probability of losing it to another opponent. This logic is similar to the one that Stoll (2008: 1121) suggest to explain their puzzling finding. At the same time, though, if the prize is so great, then losing may also be very costly. As they suggest elsewhere but in relation to candidates at legislative elections (Hicken and Stoll 2013: 296) , when the presidency is so powerful it is important to be on the winning side. Therefore, there may be an incentive not to stand a presidential candidate, but to wait and support the candidate that emerges victorious from the contest. Thus, a strong presidency may be associated both with a small number of presidential candidates and a large number. If the logic about weak and strong presidents is correct, we would expect to observe a significant reductive effect of presidential power on the number of presidential candidates only in an intermediary range when the incentive for strategic coordination is strong. We can think of this effect in terms of the electoral separation of purpose. In this intermediary range, presidents and assemblies need to cooperate with each other in order to govern effectively and avoid political deadlock. Voters understand that presidents need the support of the assembly in order to pass the national policies on which they campaigned. Therefore, they have an incentive to support the president's party at the legislative election too. Smaller parties may also see an incentive to be part of the presidential coalition rather than presenting their own candidates. For these parties, the strongest incentive to take sides occurs when the race between two serious presidential contenders is so close that by running their own candidates minor parties might risk tipping the balance in favor of their less preferred option (Shugart and Carey 1992: 255) . In sum, while we expect a positive relationship between the effective number of presidential candidates and the legislative party system, we expect presidential power to shape competition at the presidential election in a way that means we are only like to observe a reductive effect of presidential power on the legislative party system at an intermediary range of presidential power.
Overall, we differ from both Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) in that we expect the key interaction to be between presidential power and the effective number of presidential candidates, whereas they privilege proximity as a constituent element of their preferred interactions. We are agnostic about the independent effect of proximity. We wish to include an estimation of the effect of proximity to test for whether or not there is evidence of presidential coattails, but we do not necessarily expect it to find support for such an effect. In addition, whereas both Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) expect support for their preferred interactions when countries with direct presidential elections are pooled with countries with parliamentary systems, we have no such expectations about our preferred interaction. We expect to find support for it when the population is limited to countries with directly elected presidents. What is more, we argue that even if there is evidence to support both Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll's (2013) expectations when all countries are pooled, we would expect their findings still to be robust to the exclusion of parliamentary systems, otherwise a theory about the effect of direct elections would have little direct relevance to the population to which it is meant to apply.
Variable descriptions
The dependent variable in this study is the relative fragmentation of the party system at legislative elections. Consistent with Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) , Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) , we capture this variable by coding the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP). The main source of the data for this variable is Bormann and Golder's (2013) this measure is that it tries to capture actual rather than merely constitutional presidential power. Siaroff's measure comprises nine separate indicators. We conduct a factor analysis to determine whether a combination of these indicators can capture a single dimension of presidential power. However, we exclude two of them -whether or not the president is directly elected and whether the president and the legislature are elected concurrently -because they are already included independently in our study. We take the remaining seven indicators and perform an iterated factor analysis, which is appropriate for indicators recording binary variables. We retain two factors. The rotated factor loadings show one factor capturing a single dimension of presidential power comprising just one variable and another comprising three variables.
We focus on the latter. The three variables are: whether or not the president chairs cabinet meetings, has a central role in foreign policy, and in government formation. These three indicators capture a range of presidential activity, ranging from the formation of government, to its ongoing management, to the formulation of policy. So, we can be confident that together they are not simply capturing an idiosyncratic aspect of presidential power. On the basis of these indicators, we generate a four-point measure of presidential power with a range 0-3 inclusive. The rotated factor loadings and the full set of presidential power scores can be found in the supplemental materials at http://prq.sagepub.com.
The second explanatory variable is the effective number of presidential candidates (ENPC). This variable records the ENPC figure for the presidential election that was held immediately prior to the legislative election if the elections are not concurrent or at the concurrent presidential election if they are. We take the values of ENPC from the data set described in Bormann and Golder (2013) and their enpres variable. This means that in the event of an uncontested presidential election, such as ones in Ireland, we record an ENPC value of 1. Consistent with the practice adopted by Golder (2006) and Stoll (2013) , we record an ENPC value of 0 in countries without a directly elected president.
The third explanatory variable is a measure of the proximity between presidential and legislative elections (PROXIMITY). Again, we follow standard practice and follow the methodology adopted by Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) , Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) . The PROXIMITY measure ranges from a value of 0 when a legislative election is held at the exact mid-point between two presidential elections and 1 when the legislative election is held concurrently with the presidential election. The only change we make is that we calculate the value as a function of the days between the two types of elections. This means that we have a continuous variable within a range 0-1. By contrast, Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) calculate the value as a function of the years between the two types of elections. This means we have a greater variation in the values for our proximity variable than Golder and Hicken and Stoll. Even so, we are confident that this amendment does not substantively change the results because Stoll (2013) has shown that Golder's results are robust to whether years or days are used as the units to calculate the proximity index. Consistent with the existing literature, the PROXIMITY value for countries with a parliamentary system is always recorded as a value of 0.
We have three control variables. These are the same as those included in the models by Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) . The first (MAGNITUDE) captures the independent effect of the electoral system for legislative elections. MAGNITUDE is a measure of the average district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier in a country (Golder 2006: 37) . It is calculated as the total number of seats allocated in an electoral tier divided by the total number of districts in that tier. We take the values from the data set described in Bormann and Golder (2013) and their tier1_avemag variable.
Where there are missing observations we calculate the values ourselves using their formula. This affects 3.8 per cent of the total observations. Consistent with standard practice, we log the values for this variable. The second control variable (ENEG) captures the level of social divisions in a country. This is the effective number of ethnic groups. We take the values for ENEG from the replication data set that Golder (2007) 
Data and model specifications
We test our theory on an original data set of countries and elections from 1945-2011. The rules for the inclusion of countries in the data set, the full list of countries included, and the time periods for which we record elections is listed in the supplemental materials at http://prq.sagepub.com. We have a total of 546 legislative elections in 82 countries. The number of elections per country ranges from 1 to 32.
We use the models with the same constitutive explanatory variables as Golder (2006: 37) and Hicken and Stoll (2013: 301) . (See Table 1 ). However, the interaction terms and the case selection vary across the set of models. Model 1 replicates Golder's (2006) 
Results and robustness tests
We report the results of the five models in Table 1 we discuss the result with a presidential power value of 2. Like the result for Golder, we find that at this value of presidential power the proximity of presidential and legislative elections has no effect on the legislative party system whatever the value of the effective number of presidential candidates.
We do not report them, but we find the same result for values equivalent to very weak and very strong presidents too. Overall, we find that when we exclude parliamentary systems there is no longer support for either Golder's or Hicken and Stoll's hypotheses. candidates. However, as expected, the reductive effect is significant only at an intermediate range of presidential candidates. Specifically, we find a significant result for such a reduction in a range between 1.5-2.5 candidates.
When there are high values for the effective number of presidential candidates, we do not find a significant inflationary effect. We note, though, that the substantive effect of our finding is small. In terms of the control variables, the interaction effect between the effective number of ethnic groups and the natural log of average district magnitude returns the expected result.
The effective number of ethnic groups has a significant and positive effect on the legislative party system at values for the natural log of average district magnitude that are greater than about 0.5, namely outside pure first-past-thepost systems. To confirm the robustness of our result, we re-estimated Model 5 using OLS with Newey-West standard errors in the same way as Hicken and Stoll (2013) . We do not report them here, but we find almost identical results. We also re-estimated the model without the inclusion of the MAGNITUDE values that we calculated ourselves. Again, the results are substantively the same.
There is, though, a nagging concern about the presidential power variable.
We noted long-standing issues relating to the reliability of presidential power (1995) , who identified a separate independent effect of proximate elections, as well as Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) , Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) , who all found a significant effect for proximity when interacted with other variables. We stress that our findings are probabilistic. We do not claim there is no promixity effect anywhere. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to think there is a proximity effect in France, whereas generally this is not the case. More substantively, though, we are struck by how the debate about the effect of proximate elections has developed over time. Shugart and Carey (1992) first discussed the notion of an independent effect of proximity, but did not submit it to rigorous testing. Shugart (1995) did test its independent effect, but on only a relatively small number of countries. Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and Golder (2006) then tested its effect in interaction with the effective number of presidential candidates. Hicken and Stoll (2013) added a further interaction with presidential powers. One way of thinking about this debate is to say that researchers have been downgrading the independent effect of proximity over the course of time. Put another way, while the idea that presidential elections have an impact on the legislative party system is highly intuitive, work has increasingly suggested that this intuition needs to be refined. In this context, our findings merely take such a story to its logical conclusion. What is more, we have stressed that since the work of Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) 
Conclusion
This article builds on the existing literature about the effect of presidential coattails on the legislative party system. Controlling for standard electoral system and social heterogeneity variables, we argue that the legislative party system is shaped by the effective number of presidential candidates but only within an intermediary range of presidential power. This is because presidential power itself helps to determine the effective number of presidential candidates by encouraging parties to behave strategically but only in a way that we can clearly observe within such an intermediary range.
We also think differently about how we should test for the effect of this interaction. Typically, scholars have done so by pooling presidential, semipresidential, and parliamentary countries, even though the effect of the variable under investigation only applies to countries with direct presidential elections. We are skeptical that parliamentary countries can be included on the basis that they constitute a natural experiment. Instead, we suggest that the effects under consideration should be tested solely in countries with directly elected presidents. Overall, our results cast doubt on the highly intuitive idea that presidential coattails shape the legislative party system. However, they reinforce the idea that the effective number of presidential candidates is an important determinant of the legislative party system, suggesting that we need to reassess the determinants of this factor. Following Hicken and Stoll (2013) , we emphasize presidential power in this regard. We show that presidential power is a difficult concept to capture and that there are problems with many existing measures. We argue that when we wish to estimate the effect of presidential power on an outcome variable, we need to think carefully about how we capture the concept and that we should avoid drawing conclusions from results that rely on a single measure. This point applies not only to the ongoing debate about the institutional determinants of legislative party systems, but also to many topics in comparative politics more generally. Table 1 Estimating the effective number of electoral parties Marginal effect of presidential elections on enep
